The 2011 Tōhoku event showed the massive destruction potential of tsunamis. The Euro-Japan "Risk assessment and design of prevention structures for enhanced tsunami disaster resilience (RAPSODI)" project aimed at using data from the event to evaluate tsunami mitigation strategies and to validate a framework for a quantitative tsunami mortality risk analysis. Coastal structures and mitigation strategies against tsunamis in Europe and Japan are compared. Failure mechanisms of coastal protection structures exposed to tsunamis are discussed based on field data. Knowledge gaps on failure modes of different structures under different tsunami loading conditions are identified. Results of the wave-flume laboratory experiments on rubble mound breakwaters are used to assess their resilience against tsunami impact. For the risk analysis, high-resolution digital elevation data are applied for the inundation modeling. The hazard is represented by the maximum flow depth, the exposure is described by the location of the population, and the mortality is a function of flow depth and building vulnerability. A thorough search for appropriate data on the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami was performed. The results of the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami mortality hindcast for the city of Ishinomaki substantiate that the tsunami mortality risk model can help to identify high-mortality risk areas and the main risk drivers.
Introduction
The interest in tsunami research has been increasing, especially in the last decade, after the devastating consequences of the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean [Synolakis and Bernard, 2006; Synolakis and Kong, 2006; Titov et al., 2005; Papadopoulos and Satake, 2005] and the 11 March 2011 Tōhoku [Koshimura and Shuto, 2015; Romano et al., 2014; Tappin et al., 2014; Satake et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2012] tsunamis. The Great East Japan Earthquake [Satake, 2015; Kagan and Jackson, 2013; Ozawa et al., 2011] that induced the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami was of magnitude 9.0, the largest earthquake ever recorded in Japan. Its focal region extended over a wide area from the coast of Iwate Prefecture to the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture [Takahashi et al., Fig. 1 . Number of fatalities by communities [based on EERI, 2011] , combined with mean measured and modelled run-up heights [modified from Løvholt et al., 2012] . The numbers 1-7 in the inset indicate Hokkaido, Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and Okinawa Prefectures, respectively. 2011], Fig. 1 . This event clearly showed tsunamis' potential for massive destruction of buildings, infrastructure, critical coastal structures, and coastal protection structures [Koshimura and Shuto, 2015] .
Existing tsunami vulnerability and risk models are descriptive and limited; some are based on simple empirical relationships between tsunami flow depth and impact metrics such as probability of structural damages or fatalities Suppasri et al., 2012; Dunbar et al., 2011; Berryman, 2005] . Thus, better understanding of the overall vulnerability to tsunamis is necessary to develop efficient mitigation measures against future events. Moreover, the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami impact caused failures of foundations and prevention structures such as Kamaishi breakwater [Arikawa et al., 2012] . The specific mechanisms that lead to the collapse of buildings and infrastructure, as well as the performance of coastal defense structures such as the ones protecting harbors and nuclear power plants must be analyzed in detail. The substantial amount of data collected during and after the 2011 Japan event allows such a retrospective analysis [e.g. Leelawat et al., 2014; Suppasri et al., 2012 Suppasri et al., , 2013 Mori et al., 2011 Mori et al., , 2013 MLIT, 2012] .
The present paper focuses on suggestions for improved design of tsunami mitigation rubble mound breakwaters and a framework for quantitative tsunami mortality risk analysis based on data from the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami within the framework of the Euro-Japan collaborative project, Risk assessment and design of prevention structures for enhanced tsunami disaster resilience (RAPSODI). Section 2 compares coastal structures and mitigation strategies against tsunamis in Europe and Japan. Loads and failure mechanisms of coastal protection structures under tsunami impact are briefly analyzed in Sec. 3.1. Section 3.2 presents tsunami wave-flume laboratory experiments on rubble mound breakwaters, which could be used to assess their resilience against tsunami impact and to establish guidelines for tsunamisafe coastal protection structures. Field data and experience gained from the 2011 Tōhoku event (summarized in Sec. 4.1) were used for understanding the performance of selected coastal structures and for testing the functionality of the mortality risk model (Sec. 4.2) . The latter represents a new framework for quantitative tsunami vulnerability and mortality-risk analysis. It uses numerical modeling of tsunami inundation (based on high-resolution digital elevation data) and vulnerability curves (expressing the probability of fatality as a function of flow depth and building class). An example mortality-risk analysis for the city of Ishinomaki is included. Section 5 summarizes the findings and provides recommendations on the design of tsunami mitigation structures and execution of mortality risk analysis.
Tsunami Mitigation Strategies in Europe and Japan
The tsunami hazard in Europe is significant. This is clear from historical reports and geological records, as well as from tsunami hazard analysis performed for the region [Papadopoulos, 2009 [Papadopoulos, , 2016 England et al., 2015; ASTARTE, 2014a et al., 2014; Sørensen et al., 2012; Harbitz et al., 2009] . However, the preparedness against coastal hazards in Europe is typically concentrated against storm surges and erosion. There are extensive storm-surge protection measures designed for extreme events with return period from 100 to 10,000 years [METU, 2014a; IWR, 2011; Safecoast, 2008] . Storm surges may result in flooding and hence the type of structures designed for protection aims either to prevent water from overtopping the defenses or to prevent the progress of the flooding. Owing to different wave characteristics, i.e. period/duration, height, current velocity, etc., the loadings on structures are very different for storm surges and tsunamis. Hence, multipurpose design is challenging. European coastal defense structures are usually either sloping structures with rock armors or seawalls designed to reduce erosion. The differences in functionality are reflected in materials and designs. Typical protection schemes against storm surges are shown in Fig. 2 . Information about tsunami mitigation structures in Europe is very limited. Norway has applied dikes to a limited extent as countermeasure against tsunamis. Otherwise, to our knowledge, there are no tsunami countermeasure structures in Europe.
Coastal dikes are the primary structures built against tsunamis in Japan, in addition to tsunami barriers, water gates, breakwaters, and green belts. Typical tsunami countermeasures for steep versus gentle terrains in the Tōhoku region are illustrated in Fig. 3 . The Japanese approach in designing protective structures was primarily based on the historical records of tsunami heights at the site [Koshimura and Shuto, 2015] . For instance, the 4.5 m seawall along the coast of the Okushiri Island, west of Hokkaido, was probably built based on measurements from the 1983 Japan Sea tsunami. However, the 12 July 1993 Nansei-oki earthquake generated a tsunami that overflowed the seawall and devastated Okushiri Island, with the maximum tsunami height reaching 11 m. Shuto and Fujima [2009] argued with serious concerns for the 6 m high seawalls that had been constructed in several places along the Japanese Pacific coast, based on the impact of the 1960 Chilean tsunami . Even the coastal protection structures for the Fukushima nuclear power plant were initially designed based on a wave measurement of "3.122 m" off Fukushima from the 1960 Chilean tsunami . The Japanese design approach is also based on storm surge predictions, at least in some areas.
After the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami, Japan has started to follow a two-level approach for the design parameters [Koshimura and Shuto, 2015] . This approach requires all the coastal protection structures to resist a tsunami of a 150-year return period on "Level 1: Prevention level". This level aims to design coastal protection to prevent tsunamis from penetrating inland and causing casualties, structural damage, and economic loss. On the other hand, "Level 2: Preparedness/mitigation level" aims to have comprehensive disaster management measures, including coastal protection, urban planning, evacuation, and public education for the largest-possible tsunami with a recurrence interval of more than a 150-year, such as the 2011 Tōhoku event.
Mitigation systems in both Europe and Japan rely on different measures, perhaps based on differences in perspectives. "Mitigation" in Europe often means to keep natural systems in their original condition, e.g. by sand nourishments. For example, at the Baltic Sea, these measures include high foreshore, groynes, beach nourishment, a dune, a coastal forest, and a dike (Fig. 2 ). However, in Japan, due to the high loadings induced by tsunamis and storm surges, in most cases, this would be insufficient to defend the coastal areas so that hard measures are needed. The defenses are typically man-made, ranging from offshore breakwaters to tsunami walls, sea levees, and vertical evacuation structures. In Japan, evacuation and the respective structures are often part of the coastal defense strategy whereas in Europe the authorities often rely on natural or anthropogenic mitigation systems only.
Furthermore, in Japan, many nonstructural measures such as tsunami and earthquake warning systems, community-based disaster risk management, evacuation and land-use planning, as well as the use of coastal vegetation exist. The fact that tsunami mitigation must integrate several different approaches is recognized. On the contrary, only some of these nonstructural measures exist in Europe. A thorough overview of The North-eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean and connected seas Tsunami Early Warning and Mitigation System (NEAMTWS), the operational status of the associated national centers, as well as local warning systems for near-field tsunamis from various kinds of potential sources are presented by Papadopoulos [2016] . Briefly, four NEAMTWS centers (National Observatory of Athens, Greece; Centre d'alert aux Tsunami, France; National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology, Rome, Italy; Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute, Turkey) act as Tsunami Service Providers (TSPs). TSPs are in charge of analyzing seismic data in near-real time and issuing tsunami messages that are transmitted within a few minutes from the earthquake origin time to a number of official message recipients in several Euro-Mediterranean countries, in the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), Brussels and in IOC/UNESCO, Paris. Nonstructural measures against storm surges like information, evacuation, risk analysis, early warning, land-use planning, etc., are found in several countries in Europe (e.g. Germany, The Netherlands and England) [IWR, 2011; Safecoast, 2008; WMO/GWP, 2008] . Coastal hazard (storm surge) early warning systems are operational in some urban areas, e.g. Hamburg, Germany.
The differences in mitigation strategies [METU, 2014b] could probably also be attributed to differences in public tsunami awareness. The tsunami awareness in Europe [Papadopoulos, 2016; METU, 2014a; ASTARTE, 2014b,c; Harbitz et al., 2014; IOC/UNESCO, 2012; IWR, 2011; Safecoast, 2008; Västfjäll et al., 2008] depends to a large extent on the limited local history of storm surges or tsunamis, while people in Japan are more aware of both storm surges and tsunamis as the events occur more frequently.
Studies of Tsunami Impact

Impact loads and failure mechanisms of coastal protection structures
Building and coastal structure codes often do not consider tsunami loading. However, the massive destructions observed during the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami put an emphasis on proper planning of buildings, coastal protection structures, and other infrastructure that might be exposed to tsunami impact. Recently, American Society of Civil Engineers, Structural Engineering Institute [ASCE, 2016] published design guidelines against tsunami attack, see also Chock [2015] . Forces associated with tsunami consist of hydrostatic, hydrodynamic, buoyant, and surge (or breaking wave) forces, as well as impact forces due to floating objects [Nistor et al., 2008; FEMA, 2003 ]. The proposed formulas to calculate the forces mainly depend on the accurate predictions of the tsunami flow depth, flow velocity, and flow direction, which are usually obtained from numerical models, see discussion on tsunami numerical models by Behrens and Dias [2015] . Hence, the usage of validated and verified numerical models is essential [Synolakis et al., 2008] . In addition, the proposed formulas might include empirical coefficients hampered possibly by large uncertainties. Neither the different effects during run-up and backwash, nor the importance of flow direction are adequately addressed in the design codes. Thus, it is clear that more experimental data on the forces generated by tsunamis acting on various types of structures are desirable. Failure modes due to tsunami impacts are rarely described in the literature. Two failure mode matrices showing failure mechanisms of coastal structures and various land structures were derived through a literature search and are summarized in Appendix A (Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively). The failure process of a coastal protection structure is mainly initiated by a combination of hydrostatic, hydrodynamic, and surge forces. In addition, scouring may further increase the damage during overflow. Scouring on either side of the structures caused many of the failures observed during the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami. Further, some of the failures were due to the tsunami drawdown (outflow), which was probably not considered in the design of these structures. The lateral force and the buoyancy were the two main reasons for failure according to the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami data [PIANC, 2013] . The water level difference also caused seepage flow across the structure of caisson breakwaters with rubble mound foundations, thus decreasing the bearing capacity [Sassa, 2014] . The general effect of seepage and the exact sequence of the failure modes require more experiments to better understand the overall damage caused by a tsunami [Sassa et al., 2016] .
Debris impact is commonly observed in the failure of wooden structures and buildings whereas overturning, bending, punching-shear failure, and first-story collapse are the other failure modes commonly seen under impulsive tsunami loading. Under stationary conditions, scour and rebar (reinforcing bar) fracture are the most common failure modes, while overturning, rebar yielding, and wash-away due to sustained force are additional observed modes of failure. Design preventing erosion around concrete structures should be improved and extended since this was observed in most of the cases where failures occurred. Another important outcome of the observations was that soil conditions and soil-structure interaction are very important in the case of overflow. The failure mode matrices for coastal structures and buildings (Appendix A) might be useful to correlate information on structures and buildings with various loadings, in addition it indicates knowledge gaps on failure modes and loading of coastal structures.
Design codes for coastal structures such as breakwaters are focused on wind waves and storm surges since tsunamis are not frequent, at least in Europe. The performance of coastal structures under tsunami loading and overflow has gained more attention recently, mainly based on observations and field surveys of the latest tsunami events. Yet, information on the performance of rubble mound breakwaters are lacking since they are less common in Japan.
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Physical model studies of tsunami impact on coastal structures
It was clear from observations that there was lack of information available for rubble mound breakwaters and their performance under tsunami loads. Hence, rubble mound breakwaters were tested in wave flumes ( Fig. 4) at the Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI), Japan and at the Technische Universität Braunschweig (TU-BS), Germany, in collaboration with Middle East Technical University (METU), Turkey. The experimental setups and results are provided in detail by Guler et al. [2015] and LWI [2015a] for the experiments at PARI and TU-BS, respectively. Briefly, the goal of the experiments was to analyze the stability of the Haydarpaşa Port, Istanbul, Turkey rubble mound breakwater, for which tsunami loads were not taken into account for the design even though it is located in a tsunami prone area. The layout of the rubble layers and the breakwater geometry was constructed on a 1:30 scale (Fig. 5 ), and tested subject to impact of solitary like waves and constant overflow. Because of poor stability of the original breakwater, indicated by the performed experiments, doubling of the armor layer on the harbor side ( Fig. 5 (a), configuration 2a) and a berm on the seaside slope ( Fig. 5(b) , configuration 1b) were introduced as countermeasures at PARI and TU-BS, respectively, and tested additionally. In a short summary, the wave flume at PARI consisted of the sea bottom model of two slopes (1:100 and 1:10) evolving into a horizontal section with a height of 0.115 m, over which the breakwater model was built ( Fig. 4(a) ). The breakwater models tested at PARI consisted of core layer of armors of weight varying from 0 to 10 g, filter layer of thickness of 0.07 m with armor weight from 50 to 100 g, seaside [Guler et al., 2015] , and (b) TU-BS: (configuration 1b) with a berm and a crown wall unit, (configuration 2b) without a crown wall unit, (configuration 3b) with a crown wall unit corresponding to the prototype of Haydarpaşa breakwater, Istanbul, Turkey and (configuration 4b) with a shifted crown wall unit [LWI, 2015a] . Not to scale.
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slope of thickness of 0.09 m with armor weight from 100 to 150 g, and harbour slope of thickness of 0.07 m (0.14 m in the breakwater of the improved stability, Fig. 5 (a), configuration 2a) with armor weight from 50 to 100 g ( Fig. 5(a) ). The breakwater model was 0.52 and 0.50 m high on sea-and harbor side, respectively, with length of its crown of 0.12 m. The length of breakwater basis was 1.99 m (2.1 m in the breakwater of the improved stability) with the slopes of 1:1.25 and 2:5, and 1:1.25 on sea and harbor sides, respectively. The crown wall, placed on the breakwater crown, consisted of four concrete units, each 0.19 m wide, 0.12 m long, and 0.12 m high ( Fig. 6(a) ). Performance of the original breakwater model (configuration 1a) was examined under two flow regimes: solitary-like waves with the heights of 0.05, 0.075, and 0.1 m, and constant overflow with depths ranging from 1.1 to 1.95 cm above the breakwater crown wall units, while the breakwater with the improved cross-section (configuration 2a) was examined solely under constant overflow of flow depths from 1.5 to 4.6 cm above the crown wall units. The measuring technique employed in the experiments encompassed 8 wave gauges (WGs) measuring water free surface elevations, 4 ADV-type current meters recording flow velocities as well as 9 miniature pressure sensors (PSs) placed on the crown wall unit. The locations of the instruments are depicted in Figs. 4-7. Guler et al. [2015] provide the results of the experiments at PARI in detail.
In addition, four variations of the breakwater prototype with simplified geometries were examined at TU-BS ( Fig. 5(b) ) [LWI, 2015a] . The configurations were breakwater with a berm and a crown wall unit (configuration 1b), breakwater without a crown wall unit (configuration 2b), breakwater with a crown wall unit (configuration 3b, corresponding to the prototype of Haydarpaşa), and breakwater with a shifted crown wall unit (configuration 4b). Two breakwater configurations (1b + 2b and 3b+4b) were examined simultaneously dividing the wave flume into two sections to optimize the workload. In contrast to the breakwater prototype tested at PARI, the armor layer layout and the geometry of the seaside slope were simplified slightly, as shown in Fig. 5(b) , in order to reduce construction expenses. The resultant breakwater models, built with identical armor weights and thicknesses, were of constant height of 0.5 m, and seaside and harbor slopes of 2:5 and 1:1.25, respectively. Shifting of the crown wall unit to the back (configuration 4b) required an increase on the breakwater crown length to 0.33 m. Hence, the length of the breakwater at the basis was 2.2 m. The berm in configuration 1b was constructed of 0.2 m thick armor layer of weight ranging from 100 to 150 g and the slope of 2:5. L-shaped concrete units almost similar to those used at PARI constituted the crown wall (Figs. 6(a-b)). The bathymetry model was modified to meet the required conditions for the solitary like wave generation in the TU-BS wave flume -the horizontal platform bearing the breakwater models was of height 0.24 m and was equipped with a seaside slope of 1:10 ( Fig. 4(b) ). Apart from the additional breakwater configurations examined, the extension of the reference experiments at PARI encompassed also larger loads induced by solitary-like waves (wave height range from 0.05 to 0.15 m in the model scale) generated at water depth of 0.66 m and another flow regime -the tsunami bore, representing a broken, propagating tsunami (with a water depth in front of the bore gate of h 1 = 0.20 m and behind the bore gate of h 0 = 0.75-0.85 m). The water depth conditions in the tests with solitary-like wave and tsunami bore, defining the initial breakwater model submergence (i.e. breakwater submerged up to the crown and breakwater emerged, respectively), resulted from the different methods of the flow regime generation and determined the mode of the breakwater failure. The conditions in the tests with the bore corresponded in nature to a very strong withdrawal of the sea prior to tsunami impact (or to an on-land embankment). However, change of the water depth conditions by introducing other bathymetry profile was not favored concerning the comparative result analysis and the limited duration of the experiments. Due to the simultaneous testing of two breakwater configurations, spare measuring technique was employed as compared to the experiments at PARI -8 WGs, 2 current meters (ADV-type and propeller PR-type), and 2 PSs were placed on the middle crown wall unit in each configuration. The position of some of the measurement locations were varied slightly in the configurations as shown in Fig. 7 .
The performance of the breakwater models was determined based on the properties of the incident and transmitted wave/flow including wave height/flow depth, pressure induced on the crown wall unit and flow velocity. In addition, the analysis of the observed processes, including the breakwater damage were performed considering damage classification, photo/video analysis, and comparison of the breakwater profiles before and after tests.
In the bore experiments, breakwater model damages were predominantly from the pressure difference in front of and behind, as the water, released by the opening of the bore gate, dammed in front of the breakwater models. This led to the effect of blowing out the rubble layers at the leeward side from inside, with the seaside slope almost undamaged. The contribution of the overtopping of the crown wall units/breakwater crown to the overall breakwater model damage was not significant; it led to sliding of the crown wall unit down the breakwater harbor slope, Fig. 8 . In case of the experiments with solitary-like wave, the failure mode of the breakwater models was sliding of the crown wall element and the rubble down the harbor breakwater slope, induced by wave overtopping. The seaward breakwater slope as well as the berm remained generally stable under solitary-like wave attack as they were in submerged conditions (less rubble from the seaside layer was transported for the solitary-like wave than for the bore).
The presence of the crown wall unit definitely increased the stability of the armor harbor slope, as indicated by the comparative analysis of results for breakwaters with and without the crown wall unit. Hence, the breakwater configuration without the crown wall element cannot be recommended for practical implementation at tsunami prone regions, at least based on the experiment presented here. No particular advantage of the berm presence, at least for the geometry tested, was observed. Further tests should be performed to examine berm geometries different from the one applied in the experiments at TU-BS, including berm lengthening and heightening, i.e. reducing the freeboard between the berm and the still water level. This would be expected to have more influence on wave transformation over the berm, resulting in a lesser wave transmission to the leeward side.
The experimental investigations at both PARI and TU-BS indicated that the conventional breakwater design (i.e. configuration 3b in tests at TU-BS with the crown wall unit placed at the seaside edge of breakwater crown) is stable under weak tsunami conditions. Further improvement of breakwater stability under more severe tsunami impact can be achieved by thickening the armor layer at the harbor breakwater slope as indicated by the experimental results at PARI ( Fig. 5(a) , configuration 2a). Quantitatively, experimental results seem to indicate that the crown wall of the breakwaters is crucial for stability and so is the armor layer on the leeward side of the breakwater. Both parts of the breakwater could be potentially reinforced to increase the stability against tsunami attack.
The experimental results further indicated that the leeward (harbor) side of the breakwater, regardless of the configuration, was most prone to damage (displacement of the armor layers over the harbor slope as well as the crown wall unit). The processes governing the breakwater damage were directly related to the breakwater submergence conditions tested and to the wave generation method: in case of the solitary-like wave impact (submerged breakwater conditions) wave overtopping was dominant, while in case of bore impact (emerged breakwater conditions) pressure difference at both sides of the breakwater was dominant.
The most stable breakwater configuration was the one with the crown wall unit and without the berm, however it failed under the impact of higher solitary-like waves. Further improvement of its stability can be achieved by applying a doubled armor layer on the leeward side, as indicated by the model tests at PARI. Larger overtopping flow depths were attributed to the breakwater configuration without the crown wall unit. The configuration with the shifted crown wall unit was less stable under wave impact due to the lack of sufficient support of the unit by the armor layer. The effect of the berm on wave impact was not clearly observed from the experiments performed at PARI and TU-BS. km on the subduction zone plate interface at the Japan trench, at the epicenter of 38.1 • N, 142.9 • E, approximately 130 km offshore of the Oshika Peninsula. The upward co-seismic displacement [Romano et al., 2014; Satake et al., 2013; Sato et al., 2011] generated the tsunami that caused damage along the entire east coast of Honshu, and particularly resulting significant damage in Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, and Ibaraki Prefectures (Fig. 1) . For most coastal towns, the lag between the earthquake and the arrival of the first significant (inundating) tsunami was 20-25 min. The 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group [2011] assembled by 50 organizations with more than 150 people that surveyed tsunami-affected areas along the Pacific coast from Hokkaido to Okinawa Prefectures from March 12th to May 22nd 2011. Several survey teams mapped and quantified damages and fatalities in the affected areas [e.g. EERI, 2011; Goto et al., 2011; Vervaeck and Daniell, 2011] . Takahashi et al. [2011] published one of the most comprehensive overview reports concerning the initial survey results on 28 April 2011. A later report by Ranghieri and Ishiwatari [2014] summarized the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and provided guidance to other disaster-prone countries for mainstreaming "disaster risk management" in their policy development.
Tsunami Vulnerability and Risk
A comprehensive overview is also presented by NGI [2011] .
The Tōhoku tsunami caused severe damages to buildings and infrastructure along the 2,000 km coastline affected. Tsunami impacts and damages varied according to local conditions. The first wave was not always the largest, and substantial differences in tsunami run-up height (water elevation at the maximum inundation point with respect to the shoreline at the tide level at the time of the event) and inundation extent were observed between the Sendai plains and the northern Sanriku coast. While the inundation extent was much larger in the floodplains of Sendai, runup is considerably higher along the Sanriku coast. Moreover, urban areas, coastal structures, geomorphology, and rivers influenced the inundation patterns [Mori et al., 2011] . Along rivers, the inundation distance was longer and water has been transported further into the hinterland. In the aftermath of the event, main observations are briefly summarized as follows:
• Tsunami run-up heights exceeded 10 m on a 530 km stretch of coastline centered on Iwate Prefecture. In addition, tsunami trace heights exceeding 20 m were recorded in most locations along the ria Sanriku coastline. Furthermore, run-up heights of 40 m were confirmed in Ryori bay at Ofunato city, making this the maximum tsunami height ever recorded in Japan. • Approximately 20,000 people were recorded dead or missing, and 400,000 people were homeless [Dunbar et al., 2011; EERI, 2011; EM-DAT, 2011; Vervaeck and Daniell, 2011] . Most fatalities/missing occurred in Iwate (4664/1628), Miyagi (9487/2092), and Fukushima (1604/238) Prefectures [Dunbar et al., 2011; Fig. 1] . Empirical data show a correlation between maximum flow depth and the percentage of fatalities [Suppasri et al., 2012; Dunbar et al., 2011; Reese et al., 2007;  1640012-16 Berryman, 2005; see also survey papers by PARI, 2015; Løvholt et al., 2014; NGI, 2011] . • Building damages were particularly high, probably because most buildings in the area were wooden and only some major buildings were of concrete. MLIT [2012] investigated the proportion of affected buildings in six of the tsunami-impacted prefectures. In total, 250,000 buildings were affected, out of which about 140,000 were completely destroyed. The analysis showed a high correlation between the flow depth and the condition of a building. Where the flow depth exceeded 2 m, the percentage of buildings that were completely destroyed (including those washed away) was high. Building type also played a significant role [Suppasri et al., 2013] . Leelawat et al. [2014] presented a detailed analysis of building damage in Ishinomaki city, where tsunami mortality risk analysis is performed (see Sec. 4.2). • Damage to coastal structures including bay mouth breakwaters, common breakwaters, and seawalls were also documented during field surveys. The structures were destroyed by the waves or the impact of objects such as boats and containers. Details of these field surveys have been presented by PARI [2015] with representative examples: one for bay mouth breakwaters (Kamaishi Bay) and another for common breakwaters (Hachinohe Port). In the latter example, researchers concluded that implementing countermeasures to prevent overflow scouring is the most important design task for future breakwaters. Finally, the damages to shore protection facilities in Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures were surveyed by Kumagai et al. [2012] . Analyses by PIANC [2013] showed that the safety factor for sliding was generally lower than the safety factor for overturning. • Environmental impacts also occurred, most significantly related to the leak of nuclear radiation from the Fukushima nuclear power plant . Other environmental impacts related to the tsunami were pollution by waste and debris as well as salt-water intrusion affecting future cropping. In Rikuzentakata, over 70% of the land was affected by salinization [EERI, 2011] . The earthquake triggered also secondary environmental impacts, such as 200 landslides [Vervaeck and Daniell, 2011] . • The costs of the damages shortly after the event summed up to an order of $300 billion in direct losses [EM-DAT, 2011; Mimura et al., 2011; Mori et al., 2011 ]. An extraordinarily high number of indirect losses in terms of reduced economic activity and interruption of supply chains for a longer period were also expected. After all, damages are estimated to be the highest economical loss from an earthquake/tsunami ever [EERI, 2011; Vervaeck and Daniell, 2011] .
Example tsunami mortality risk analysis for the city of Ishinomaki
Detailed surveys of tsunami vulnerability and risk studies are presented by González-Riancho et al. [2014 . The weights are generally gained by expert judgement or depending on available data, which increases the uncertainty of the overall results and reduces the applicability of the models to other regions. Tsunami fragility curves relating the damage probability to a certain tsunami metric (usually the flow depth) and the building characteristics have also been derived [Løvholt et al., 2015; Suppasri et al., 2013; Leone et al., 2011; Valencia et al., 2011; Berryman, 2005] . Tsunami vulnerability analyses typically start with calculating the inundation area and depth by numerical models in order to understand the extent of the structural damage as well as the number of people affected by the tsunami. Based on previous modeling [Løvholt et al., 2012; NGI, 2011] , rough estimates could be made on a correlation between flow depths and the number of fatalities in certain villages. In Fig. 1 , the modeled surface elevations as well as the measured run-up heights are shown. Further, Fig. 1 shows the highest absolute number of deaths and missing in the city of Ishinomaki, which is a densely populated town close to the shore. Although flow depths were lower here than in many other areas, the high population density and also debris from collapsed buildings, that has shown to considerably contribute to loss of life and damage [Dalrymple et al., 2006] , most likely contributed to the high number of fatalities. Even though Ishinomaki has the highest absolute number of fatalities, the percentage is quite small due to the size of the city. The fact that a comparably small area was flooded might underpin that the effect of flotsam is rather significant.
During recent years, NGI has developed a generic model based on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) for local analyses of tsunami mortality risk [NGI, 2009a [NGI, , 2009b . The model was first employed for a tsunami forecast scenario affecting Bridgetown, Barbados in the Caribbean [NGI, 2009c] and further developed within a forecast study for the city of Batangas, the Philippines [NGI, 2009d] , and is described in more detail below. The model was later tested by hindcasting the 2009 South Pacific tsunami in American Samoa , and the results corresponded well to the actual death tolls, i.e. the model successfully estimated the mortality. For further validation and development, the model was used for hindcasting the fatalities due to the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami in the city of Ishinomaki. Normally a certain tsunami scenario with a corresponding return period is applied for vulnerability and mortality risk analysis. In this hindcast analysis performed primarily for model validation, attention is not paid to the probability of the scenario; hence admittedly not quantifying the temporal probability of the "hazard".
The tsunami mortality risk is modeled using the following equations: mortality risk = hazard * consequence, where consequence = exposure * vulnerability.
Here, the terms mortality risk, hazard, exposure, and vulnerability are defined according to the United Nations/International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) [https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology]. The calculation of the vulnerability is based on empirical data accessible through literature search. Eidsvig et al. [2011] collected data from different sources containing fatality rates associated to flow depths from tsunamis in western Norway [Furseth, personal communication, 2007; Furseth, 2006; Tinti et al., 1999; Jørstad, 1968] , from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami [Rossetto et al., 2007; EEFIT, 2006] , and from the July 2006 Java tsunami [Reese et al., 2007] . The data were used to derive a relation between the flow depth and vulnerability with upper and lower bounds to include the uncertainty in the data and the influence of other parameters, such as physical environment and exposure, on the vulnerability [Eidsvig et al., 2011] . The S-shaped vulnerability curves that they propose return that above a certain limit, approximately every exposed person is fatally impacted by the tsunami (below a certain threshold in flow depth, the tsunami causes no harm):
Here, S is the vulnerability, k and λ are constants, and H represents the flow depth. This is a continuous function that mathematically never equals zero, hence it should be used with caution for the smallest flow depths, i.e. not for depths less than about 1 m. Since vulnerability defined in this way describes the mortality (i.e. the probability of loss of human lives), the terms mortality and tsunami mortality risk model are used below. The mortality risk calculations are carried out using the spatial analysis capabilities of GIS ArcMap ( c by ESRI), but the presented procedures can be effectuated with every standard GIS-software.
The applied earthquake source and the tsunami modeling are described by NGI [2015] and Løvholt et al. [2012] . The tsunami modeling is performed in two stages. First, the initial sea surface displacement due to the earthquake is inputted to the dispersive tsunami propagation model (GloBouss; see Pedersen and Løvholt [2008] ) simulating the tsunami from the source area to the shoreline of Japan. The results from the propagation model is then conveyed into the tsunami modeling tool Com-MIT [Titov et al., 2011] based on Method of Splitting Tsunami (MOST) [Titov et al., 2016] to simulate the inundation.
The inundation modeling was performed with digital elevation models (DEMs) of various resolution and quality. SRTM 1 -based inundation modeling consequently overestimates the inundation distance, while the ASTER 2 -based inundation modeling clearly underestimates the inundation distance. For the modeling runs presented below, which were performed for seven different domains along the east coast of Japan from 37.8 • N to about 39.0 • N, the very high-resolution (VHR) DEM data from Geographical Survey Institute of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Japan, were resampled to a grid resolution of 22.2 m × 17.5 m (0.0002 • ×0.0002 • ) in order to reduce the computational time, i.e. to be able to model sufficiently large areas. The inundation modeling based on the VHR Japanese DEM also overestimated the inundation distances, but to a less extent than the SRTMbased modeling. Type and origin of other data like bathymetry, pre-and post-DEMs, city borderlines, building outlines and overbuilt areas, water marks and inundated areas (for model validation), building damage, and population are described in detail by NGI [2015] .
The results of the VHR-based inundation modeling agree favorably with the observations of inundated areas and flow depths (water marks, see NGI [2015] ). It should be noted that buildings and infrastructure were not included in the simulations. Such obstructions will normally increase the flow resistance and thus reduce the inundation distance. An example is provided in Fig. 9 (right panel) featuring the shaded terrain information with superimposed inundation modeling results, where a road (linear white feature) that is elevated above the surrounding terrain forms a natural barrier. However, there are bridges where the water should pass below these (example shown in Fig. 9, left panel) . Therefore, bridges were removed in the data in order to give correct effects during the inundation modeling. As an example of the inundation modeling results, the maximum flow depth (height of the tsunami above the ground) and maximum inundation height (onland water elevation with respect to the tide level at the time of the event) of the tsunami at Sendai are shown in Fig. 10 . The maximum flow depth is more than 10 m close to the shoreline. The road marked with red arrows reduces significantly the tsunami inundation. Here, the flow depth is reduced by about 3 m (from 6 m). The maximum surface elevation (in the sea) and the maximum inundation height (on land) measured from still water are highest at the shoreline (about 10 m) and is reduced inward down to about 3-4 m at the trimline. The convergences for both the tsunami propagation and the tsunami inundation models are thoroughly tested to confirm the reliability of the results. The modeling results are compared against post-tsunami field measurements on flow depth, inundation height, and inundation area that were available from the "Reconstruction assistance research archive" (http://fukkou.csis.utokyo.ac.jp/). In general, the agreement between modeling results and field data is good. Generally, flow depth values are slightly higher than the measured watermarks. Deviations are in the order of 0.5 to 1.5 m [NGI, 2015] . Flow depth is the most important, but not the only parameter influencing the mortality, i.e. current velocity, flotsam, etc., also play an important role. The possible mortality value for one flow depth is between the lower and upper bound of the mortality (flow depth relation). Here, the structural building vulnerability (assessed in a way similar to the PTVA method; ; ) is applied to select the "correct" mortality value between these bounds (for a given flow depth), as described by NGI [2015, 2009a] .
In principle, the approach presented here thus requires that information on building vulnerability is available [e.g. NGI, 2009c] . As building vulnerability was not available in an appropriate format, a synthetic uniform building vulnerability layer was introduced for the built-up areas within the boundaries of the city of Ishinomaki. Since the information to differ between low (0) and high (1) building vulnerability was not available, two different model runs were performed, i.e. the uniform building vulnerability was set to 0.25 and 0.5. These values correspond to the building ratio for buildings washed away for flow depths of about 3-4 m as presented by Suppasri et al. [2013] . Not including buildings that collapsed or were damaged without being washed away (i.e. using a low building vulnerability) is a rough proxy for not including the people that managed to escape before the impact of the tsunami. The resulting mortality risk map is presented in Fig. 11 (left panel) .
In order to evaluate the human population exposure to the tsunami, the population census data for 2010 was used. Population exposure is represented by the number of persons per 500 m × 500 m grid cell, which is the resolution of the gridded census data [Maruyama and Tanaka, 2014] . Combining the mortality risk map with the population raster (2010 census data) results in the modeled (expected) number of fatalities per grid cell (Fig. 11, right panel) . Using synthetic uniform building vulnerabilities of 0.25 and 0.50, the calculated expected fatalities are 2,900 and 5,800, respectively. Reported actual death tolls for the city of Ishinomaki vary between 3,000 (source: Asahi Shimbun, 11 March 2013) and nearly 4,000 (source: Ishinomaki Fund). It is clear that, located about 130 km west of the epicenter, Ishinomaki had the highest number of fatalities among the cities affected by the disaster. Of the total estimated fatalities of 20,000 in Japan, approximately 20-30% (percentage depending on the considered information source) occurred in Ishinomaki.
Concluding Remarks
In this study, knowledge and data on tsunami vulnerability and risk as well as on physical and numerical modeling of tsunamis have been exchanged between Japanese and European researchers. The final products bring together information on coastal mitigation strategies in Europe and Japan, on failure modes of coastal protection structures, and on tsunami mortality-risk analyses that has not yet been collated before. Structural and nonstructural tsunami mitigation measures differ greatly in Japan and Europe, perhaps also due to differences in the real and perceived tsunami risks. In Japan, there is a great variety of measures extending from coastal dikes of advanced design to community preparedness and protection by coastal vegetation, although some gaps and deficiencies exist. Japanese mitigation strategies usually consist of hard measures leading to long distances of artificial shorelines. In Europe, tsunami mitigation is rare and limited to a few types of measures and locations. A possible reason for this is a likely underestimation of tsunami hazard in Europe. Europe has a longer natural coastline that combines soft and hard measures for other hazards. Natural defenses such as dunes are often integrated into the hazard mitigation strategies. The recent research on potential tsunami sources and risk, as well as the performance of existing coastal and near-shore structures under tsunami loading reviewed here indicate that more action should be taken on tsunami mitigation in Europe. The mitigation strategies on the Japanese side should be enhanced to become more resilient, preferably using composite systems against tsunamis. It is generally advisable to build on a "stepwise" defense strategy rather than relying on single hard structures. Soft strategies against coastal hazards should also be considered.
Based on literature search and laboratory experiments, it is found that knowledge on impact loads and failure modes of coastal protection structures could be enhanced through further experimental studies for tsunami impacts, particularly for rubble mound breakwaters. Critical issues comprise wave loading and the respective failure modes for different types of material and reinforcement, slope, and wave front and bore characteristics. Coastal tsunami defenses should be built in such a way that they do not slide, even during overtopping. Likewise, scour protection against tsunami-induced currents around mitigation structures should be further investigated and improved. The performance of storm-surge mitigation structures under possible tsunami loading, especially in the case of European structures, needs further investigations. There should be buildings available that may serve as vertical evacuation structures. In order to withstand tsunamis, their foundations must be carefully dimensioned and protected against scour, where necessary. Furthermore, it is important that these structures have adequate capacity and are distributed such that they can be reached on time.
A generic model for local analyses of tsunami mortality risk (loss estimates) has been developed and validated in an example study for the city of Ishinomaki. The model is based on high-resolution digital surface elevation data, numerical modeling of tsunami inundation, building type/vulnerability and population data, and empirical relations for damage and fatalities as a function of tsunami flow depth. The maximum flow depth was obtained by hindcasting the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. It is shown that the GIS-based tsunami mortality risk model hindcasts reasonably well the mortality for the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami event, given the large parameter uncertainties and assumptions that had to be made. With the help of the model, it is possible to identify high mortality risk areas, as well as to diagnose the risk-contributing factors in high-risk areas, which often can be attributed to either high to very high flow depths, high population concentration (causing high exposure), vulnerable building mass, or combination of these factors. The results of the model can be used, e.g. to produce maps showing different mortality risk scenarios to be expected for different flow depth scenarios with corresponding probabilities. This could help in meaningful urban planning, allowing for the identification and selection of evacuation routes, evacuation locations, planning of mitigation structures, etc. Accessing the large amount of presumably available post-disaster field data was more challenging than expected when carrying out the tsunami mortality risk modeling.
The design of the GIS-based tsunami mortality risk model allows for the expansion of the model with new or other parameters, as well as for the refinement of already implemented parameters. A limitation of mortality risk analysis presented here is that in the census data, population is only present in settlement areas, i.e. not in industrial areas by the harbor. This implies that the approach neglects all fatalities outside these settlement areas. This is an obvious shortcoming in view of the severe damage and the high number of fatalities reported in nearshore working areas. Commuter data do exist and can be included in the approach, but such data were not available in time to be implemented in the present study.
Possible examples with inclusion of seawalls/breakwaters should anyhow be presented with caution, as the present structures have limited effect on the worst-case scenarios like the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami. The lessons learned from the analyses are summarized further by LWI [2015b] , sharing experiences on design of tsunami mitigation structures and mortality risk analyses that can assist in reducing the current tsunami risk along the European and Japanese coastlines as well as elsewhere.
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Appendix A. Failure Mode Matrices
A summary of failure modes for coastal and land structures under tsunami impact are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 with examples, when available. The observations are mostly from the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami simply because of the availability, but information from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was also included when producing the matrices. In most cases, the destructions resulted from several types of failures. Hence, it is hard to determine the exact process, which caused the failure . Observations are usually after the event, thus, they can only give information on the total failure or the most prominent failure mode. For instance, scouring at the base of the structure is often associated with removal of concrete slabs, washout of sand fill or erosion of leeward slopes. Slope instability (failure) on the leeward side covers all the secondary processes (removal of concrete slabs, washout of sand fill, etc.) mentioned above. Seaward slope instability (failure) covers removal of blocks in case of rubble mound structures or seaward protection of vertical structures.
Using the field observations, the drivers for failure modes for coastal structures may be categorized into two main processes: (1) water level difference across the structure, and (2) for each of the processes and for different types of coastal structures is presented in Table A .1.
1-A; 2-A; 3-A:
The coastal area in Otsuchi village was completely destroyed by the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami as the breakwater failed and the tsunami propagated inland along the Otsuchi and Kotsuchi rivers. Hydraulic control structures and seawalls were completely overtopped during the inundation [Mori et al., 2013] . Nagasawa and Tanaka [2012] observed that the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami acted on the revetments during return flow and pushed them seaward.
1-J:
1.1-B:
During the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami, two large scour profiles at the leeward slope of the curved 2.5 m high concrete seawall to the east of Ishinomaki port extended about 60.0 m in length along the seawall. The massive concrete platform placed at the toe of the leeward slope disappeared due to the tsunami, implied by two scour holes .
1.1-H:
In some cases, the concrete seawalls were overturned by return flow rather than by the incoming 2011 Tōhoku tsunami [EERI, 2011] .
1640012-26
Coast. Eng. J. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com by 193.156.5.162 on 12/20/16. For personal use only. Yeh et al. [2012] conducted surveys along the Sanriku coast after the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami and stated that destruction of upright solid-concrete type seawalls was closely related to the tsunami induced scour.
1.2-B; 1.2-C:
1.2-E:
Destruction of upright solid-concrete type seawalls after the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami was also closely related to soil instability. The rapid decrease in flow depth during the return-flow phase caused soil fluidization down to a substantial depth. This mechanism explains the severe undermining of foundations observed in the area along the Sanriku coast. Soil instability played a major role in the failures [Yeh et al., 2012] .
1.2-H:
Overturning of a seawall as observed on the Ryoishi Coast, Iwate Prefecture, during the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami may occur if the overturning moment induced by the wave load on the seawall during tsunami run-up or drawdown is larger than the resistance moment due to the weight of the seawall [Kato et al., 2012] .
1.3-B:
During the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami, the high flow velocities with intense turbulence resulted in severe undermining damage and formation of a large scour hole behind the mound-type seawall, such as in Kanahama [Yeh et al., 2012] . Jayaratne et al. [2013] noticed severe damage to the leeward slope and toe of the sea dike at Soma city during the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami. Diverse failure patterns were observed from the north to the south side, resulting in partial to total failure of the leeward face due to scour.
2.2-B:
2.2-C:
Seaward flow over the coastal dike may cause scouring at the seaward toe of the dike as also pointed out in previous studies [Noguchi et al., 1997] . During the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami, seaward flow during drawdown caused scouring at the seaward toe of the coastal dike and revetment. Scouring at the leeward toe affected the stability of the seaward armor, resulting in seaward armor floating away and breaching of the dike [Kato et al., 2012] .
3.1-B, D, E:
All these failure modes due to tsunami overflow were observed in Kamaishi and Hachinohe breakwaters during the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami. Later, both breakwaters were modeled in laboratory experiments to determine the factor of safety regarding sliding and overturning considering the leeward scour (at the foundation level) as well as bearing capacity failure (soil failure) [Arikawa and Shimosako, 2013] .
3.2-G:
Large concrete armor units were located in front of the seaward slope of the breakwater at Ishinomaki Port as part of the structure. After the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami hit the area, the primary armor units on the seaward slope were displaced and scattered in front of the breakwater, and some units were buried under tsunami deposits, though there was no indication of damage to the seaward slope . Esteban et al. [2013] stated that the exact failure mechanism for each of the breakwater types is still unclear, and whether armor units were displaced by the incoming or the outgoing wave during the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami could not be easily established for any of the observed failures. Therefore, they carried out some preliminary laboratory experiments indicating that although the incoming tsunami wave can cause some movement to the caisson, the major failure mode of the armor could occur as a result of the outgoing wave.
3.3-F:
3.3-H:
In Kamaishi City, the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami overturned the northern section (990 m in length) of the newly completed offshore breakwater. The southern section (670 m in length) was left inclined, otherwise mainly intact [Fraser et al., 2013; Yagyu, 2011] .
4.1-I:
Concrete parapets were installed in several places along the shoreline to prevent wind-wave overtopping, but some of the parapets were broken by the 2011 tsunami run-up. Tsunami drawdown also leads to parapet failure, in particular because parapets are designed only for loads of incident waves, and not for drawdown [Kato et al., 2012] .
4.2-A:
At Kesennuma, the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami flowed northward into the bay and arrived at the harbor as a fast-flowing rising tide [Japan Coast Guard, 2011] overtopping harbor walls and river defenses. Harbor walls at the Yuriage Port also showed functional failure (overtopping) [Fraser et al., 2013] .
5-B:
Scour on the leeside was a main cause of embankment failure in Yamamoto town during the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami [The 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group, 2011].
6-A:
Most seawalls had heavy steel gates to allow for vehicular traffic through the wall, and they need to be closed when a tsunami warning is announced. It appeared that such gates were successfully closed prior to the 2011 tsunami arrival, and that the majority of the gates resisted the incoming flow. However, they often failed during the return flow that they were not designed for [EERI, 2011] .
6-H:
Many tsunami gates designed to reduce flooding along rivers were overturned by the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami [World Bank, 2012] .
Failure modes for land structures based on model tests and field data are presented in Table A .2. The failures may be grouped according to the main driving processes: (1) impulsive tsunami loading, and (2) quasi-static (standing) tsunami pressure. The structures are also grouped according to the protection measures, the construction type, and the separate parts of the structures. investigation included more than 130 structures: (a) buildings with simple configuration, (b) fence walls, (c) reinforced concrete or masonry columns (bridge piers, gate piers, etc.), (d) stone monuments, (e) seawalls, and (f) steel fences. Asai et al. [2012] provided relationships between equivalent tsunami pressure, flow velocity, Froude number, and structural damage and four different failure modes for different types of structures as rebar yielding, rebar fracture, sliding, and overturning. Ghobarah et al. [2006] conducted a field investigation in areas of Thailand and Indonesia affected by the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Many reinforced concrete columns failed due to the impact of large and heavy objects such as boats and cars. The inclusion of redundancies in the design may ensure that the structure will not collapse due to the failure of one or two columns [Ghobarah et al., 2006 ]. 1-A; 2.1.2-B high-intensity tsunami attack. Wooden walls were damaged at the moment the water hits the wall and the failure was explosive. However, the destruction and the failure mechanism of concrete walls depended on the thickness and the strength. A bending or punching shear failure occurred when the concrete was low-strength, whereas the failure mode shifted from local failure to complete destruction when the concrete was high-strength. Arnason et al. [2009] investigated tsunami-structure interaction with laboratory experiments for vertical acrylic columns of different cross-sections impacted by a bore-like flow of a broken tsunami wave. The water-surface variations, velocity flow fields, and forces on columns were measured, however, no information was provided on the failure mechanism of the structures.
1.2.1; 2.2.1-E:
2.1.
2.2.2:
2.3; 2.1.1; 2.4.2-E; All J: Yalciner et al. [2011] reported field survey findings performed in areas hit by the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami. Tsunami energy was focused in narrow long bays and propagated inland along rivers. Large scale erosions were observed around the concrete structures and, in some cases, caused overturning. Almost all wooden structures were either destroyed by debris impact or carried away due to strong currents, only a few out of thousands of buildings survived. Meyyappan et al. [2013] conducted laboratory experiments to investigate the effect of a sequence of waves (tsunami "blows") on buildings of various configurations and stated that the number of tsunami "blows" is essential in the design of tsunami resistant structures. Circular buildings were found to be better than rectangular/square shaped buildings.
2.3.1; 2.3.2-C:
3.1-E, F, G, N, O; 3.2-E, H, M, P:
Building Research Institute and National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism jointly carried out a site investigation for building damage caused by the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami in six cities in the Iwate Prefecture (Miyako, Yamada, Otsuchi, Kamaishi, Ofunato, and Rikuzen-Takata), and nine cities in the Miyagi Prefecture (Kesennuma, Minami-sanriku, Onagawa, Ishinomaki, Sendai, Natori, Iwanuma, Watari, and Yamamoto). Fukuyama et al. [2013] observed seven types of damage patterns of reinforced concrete buildings as: pancake collapse, first story collapse, overturning and movement, tilting and drifting by scouring, sliding, fracture of wall (opening) and debris impact. For the steel buildings, main patterns are washout caused by fracture of exposed column base and capital connection, overturning, large residual deformation, and debris impact.
